Monday, January 10, 2005

The Iran dossier

United Press International
By Claude Salhani
January 10, 2005

WASHINGTON -- As soon as President George W. Bush brushes the confetti off his lapels and returns to the Oval Office from his second inaugural parade on Jan. 20, he will find a series of "presidential papers" on Iran, requiring his immediate attention, waiting for him.

Well-informed Washington insiders say the nation's top think tanks have been scurrying over the last several weeks to put the finishing touches on comprehensive policy papers, or presidential directives that would help the Bush administration formulate a policy on Iran for the next four years.

The abridged version of these exhaustive papers will be along the line of "What the heck do we do with Iran?"

Indeed, just a few days after his second inauguration, the president will be driven back up Pennsylvania Avenue to Capitol Hill where he will deliver his State of the Union address to the nation. Iran, most likely, will deserve a mention of note. It was in his 2002 State of the Union speech that Bush placed Iran, along with North Korea and Iraq, in his now infamous Axis of Evil.

Now, three years later, it remains unclear what course U.S. policy regarding Iran is likely to follow, but according to more than one analyst, the second Bush administration will delve into the Iran dossier with renewed vigor.

The Iran dossier comprises three aspects: first, the Islamic Republic's pursuit of nuclear weapons technology; second, the United States' accusation that Iran supports terrorism; and third, Iran's involvement in Iraq. These are all points that the president will have to address.

"U.S. policy will have to shift to the policy of supporting democratic opposition to bring about regime change," Alireza Jafarzadeh, president of Strategic Policy Consulting, told United Press International. Barring a change of regime in Iran, Washington should get used to the idea of a nuclear-armed Islamic Republic, as all indications are that Iran is set to follow its desire to join the nuclear club.

However, warns Jafarzadeh, the world cannot afford to allow Iran "to acquire the nuclear bomb as well as erect a sister Islamic Republic in Iraq while suppressing its own population."

It was Jafarzadeh who in August of 2002 revealed Iran's Natanz and Arak nuclear sites to the international community. At the time he was the spokesperson in Washington for Iran's National Council of Resistance of Iran, a group otherwise known as the Mujahedin-e-Khalq, or MEK. The United States had designated the MEK as a foreign terrorist organization in 1997.

Iran's pursuit of its nuclear weapons program is sure to continue despite periodic disclaimers to the contrary by officials in Tehran. Well-controlled and carefully orchestrated visits by inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency are not about to reveal anything, either, as the Iranians have learned to disperse and camouflage their work.

From Tehran's perspective, it makes sense for Iran to push ahead. Iran has always viewed itself as a regional sphere of influence, hoping to sway the region's policies. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution when the Shiite clergy toppled the imperial rule of Shah Reza Pahlavi, Iran's theocratic regime has been trying -- one should add without too much success -- to export its revolution to neighboring countries. Outside of Lebanon, where the Revolutionary Guards found sympathetic ears in the country's largely under-privileged Shiite community, repeated calls from Iran's mullahs to the people of the Middle East to topple their "corrupt leaders" has gone unheeded.

However, now for the first time since 1979, Iran is seeing new opportunities open up in neighboring Iraq, a country with a majority Shiite population. Faced with this dilemma, the United States has three options.

First, the United States can avoid confrontation and continue to engage Iran in dialogue, hoping that Iran will see logic in diplomacy. This is the European Union's favorite policy. "This option produced a 2004 accord with Iran to freeze some of its nuclear programs that might allow for weapons development," Raymond Tanter, a visiting professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, told UPI.

The problem with this option is that it failed to produce concrete results in the past because Iran did not respect prior agreements. "This route is bound to fail," said Tanter, who served on the National Security Council staff and as representative of the secretary of Defense to arms control talks in the Reagan administration.

Iran's nuclear aspiration is also worrying other countries in the immediate neighborhood such as Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, each with an important Shiite minority. Furthermore, the speed with which the United States managed to topple Saddam Hussein's regime in Baghdad is yet further incentive for Tehran to arm itself with nuclear deterrence.

The second option, Tanter believes, is for Israel or the United States to conduct military strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities. "But because Iran has hidden, hardened, dispersed, and placed its nuclear facilities in populated areas, military strikes are unlikely to be effective and may lead to escalation and expansion of combat," said Tanter.

This leaves the third option -- and the most logical one -- that of regime change. This option fits in with the hard approach preferred by the neo-cons in the Bush administration. Both Tanter and Jafarzadeh believe the Bush administration will opt for beginning a "process of changing the regime in Tehran" sometime soon after the second inauguration.

There is one minor snag however, and that is the lack of an organized opposition able to help bring about regime change. One of the main opposition groups, the MEK, remains on the U.S. list of terrorist organizations. To collude with those opposition forces requires the United States to remove restrictions against Iranian opposition groups, argues Tanter.

Because the MEK and its associate political umbrella organization, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, have "been instrumental in exposing some of Tehran's key nuclear secrets, President Bush is likely to favor lifting the terrorist designation on the MEK in 2005," says Tanter.

"The removal of the MEK's terror designation would be a litmus test for the new administration to adopt a tougher approach toward the Iranian regime," said Jafarzadeh.

What the Bush team will learn, however, is that there are no simple answers to the Iranian predicament. Bringing about regime change through the support of democratic forces in the country, while desirable, may prove to be harder than expected.

Finally, a word of caution: paraphrasing the secretary of defense, it is true that you underwrite revolutions and foment regime changes with the opposition you have, not the opposition you want. Lessons should be learned, however, from the Ahmad Chalabi affair in Iraq and what happened when too much trust was placed in him and his organization. In dealing with the Mujahedin-e-Khalq one should recommend caution.

Wednesday, January 5, 2005

Risks of appeasing Iran's mullahs

The Washington Times
By Struan Stevenson
January 5, 2005

Iran's increasing meddling in Iraq and its defiance in its nuclear weapons program pose the greatest challenge to peace and security in Iraq and the whole Middle East, as we enter 2005.

By sending thousands of Revolutionary Guards and intelligence agents into Iraq, as well as spending hundreds of millions of dollars to recruit mercenaries and enlist support among destitute and impoverished Iraqis, Tehran is hell-bent on steering the Jan. 30 elections in its favor.

Its proxies in that country, including the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), have put forward a united slate, hoping to gain a majority in the newly elected parliament, whose primary task is to draft Iraq's future constitution. The Iranian clerics have never been so close to realizing their decades-old dream of erecting a sister Islamic Republic in Iraq.

On the nuclear issue, the recent agreement brokered by France, Germany and the United Kingdom on behalf of the European Union, has given Tehran all that it wanted and more. The Iranians have committed themselves to virtually nothing permanent. Reports this week indicate Tehran has prepared large quantities of uranium yellow cake for enrichment, which diplomats say breaks, if not the letter, the spirit of the Nov. 15 pact with the EU big three.

In return, Iran received a host of incentives, including a light-water reactor as well as the promise of European technological expertise to advance its "peaceful" nuclear program. More importantly, it demanded and received a commitment from its European interlocutors not only to keep Tehran's arch-nemesis, the Iranian People's Mujahedeen, on the EU terror list, but also to fight its activities.

The EU's lack of spine in dealing with Tehran has emboldened the mullahs to step up repression in Iran. A resolution just adopted by the U.N. General Assembly censured Tehran for "failure to comply fully with international standards in the administration of justice, the absence of due process of law, the refusal to provide fair and public hearings, and right to counsel, the continuing executions, in particular the execution of persons below 18 years of age, the arbitrary arrest and detention without charge or trial, the use of torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment, in particular the practice of amputation and flogging as well as the systemic discrimination against women and girls."

The deterioration of human rights in Iran has revealed new depths of barbarity, where pregnant women and children are routinely executed and floggings and amputations are an almost daily public spectacle. The ban on the moderate Khatami faction from standing for election last February reduced the so-called democratic process to a sham. In place of those moderates, the Legislature now has 40 new deputies who were former Revolutionary Guards commanders and who have formed a hard, extremist right-wing majority to drive increasingly repressive judicial and executive measures.

These stark realities, however, have not deterred the ever-shrewd and business-minded Europeans. Claiming any attempt at firmness toward Tehran would be tantamount to starting an Iraqi-style war, the EU and its allies on the other side of the Atlantic argue conciliation is the best approach.

This deliberately obscures the fact that facing up to the Iranian challenge need not involve a choice between war and appeasement. As the exiled opposition leader Maryam Rajavi said during an address to the European Parliament on Dec. 15, "No concession is going to dissuade the mullahs from continuing their ominous objectives. ... The equation of 'either a military invasion or appeasement' is an exercise in political deception. A third option is within reach. The Iranian people and their organized resistance have the capacity and ability to bring about change."

As Iran inches closer to acquiring a nuclear bomb and developing, with North Korea's help, the missiles to deliver them, the civilized world can ill-afford to be at the mercy of these turbaned tyrants. The bitter, costly experience of Iran's people in the past quarter-century should serve as an example.

Appeasement is not the way to contain or change this evil regime. Nor is it the path to avoid another war. A nuclear-armed fundamentalist regime will not spare the EU, either. Iran's missiles already can reach southern Europe. The mullahs are now rushing to develop a third-generation missile system able to reach Paris, London and Brussels.

By putting the People's Mujahedeen in its terror list, however, the EU has handcuffed itself.

The EU should end the blacklisting of this antifundamentalist group, which provided some of the most critical information on Iran's nuclear weapons program and its intervention in Iraq.

For once, we should side with the millions in Iran whose cry is for freedom and regime change. A modern, secular and democratic Iran would not only be the key to regional peace and security, but also a long-term ally as we try to spread democracy across the Middle East and the world.

Struan Stevenson is a Scottish Conservative member of the European Parliament and co-chairman of the Friends of Free Iran Intergroup in the European Parliament.

Wednesday, May 28, 2003

Stance on Iran Stirs U.S. Debate Amid Cancellation of Meeting

The Wall Street Journal
May 28, 2003
By DAVID S. CLOUD

WASHINGTON -- U.S. administration officials are engaged in a heated debate over how to deal with Iran, which said it has no knowledge of al Qaeda leaders the U.S. says operate from its territory and warned the U.S. to stay out of its affairs.

Tuesday, the White House canceled a meeting that was to assess how responsive Tehran is being to U.S. requests for movement against the alleged al Qaeda presence in Iran. White House envoy Zalmay Khalilzad has held periodic meetings with Iranian officials in Geneva, but a planned meeting last week was also canceled to emphasize the U.S. desire for action, administration officials said.

Tensions between Washington and Tehran have escalated over U.S. charges that this month's car bombings in Saudi Arabia were overseen by al Qaeda leaders in Iran -- part of a pattern, U.S. officials assert, of threatening actions emanating from within Iran. Some U.S. officials say intelligence reports of al Qaeda's presence in Iran are strong enough that the Bush administration shouldn't continue even informal diplomatic contacts unless Tehran cooperates in rounding up members of the terrorist network.

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said Tuesday that the U.S. will continue contacts with Iran. "Our policies are well-known, and I'm not aware of any changes in policy," he told reporters. "We have contacts with them. They will continue."

On Monday, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi said Iran has no interest in helping al Qaeda's Islamic militants. Some of the group's members may have slipped into the country illegally, he said, and several are currently under investigation, but none has been identified as a senior member. Iran also said Monday that it had arrested several suspected al Qaeda members, but White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said Tuesday that Iran's response was insufficient.


As U.S. policy makers discuss taking a tougher stance on Iran, Tehran told Washington to stay out of its domestic affairs. "We hope that wisdom and logic dominates the Americans' debates and they refrain from carrying out any interference in our affairs," Mr. Asefi told Reuters new agency.

Tuesday, May 27, 2003

U.S. Officials to Discuss Iran as Tensions Escalate

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
May 27, 2003
By DAVID S. CLOUD


WASHINGTON -- Senior U.S. officials plan to meet Tuesday to discuss Iran after authorities there said they had no knowledge that any senior al Qaeda leaders were operating from Iranian territory.

Tensions between Washington and Tehran have escalated this month over U.S. charges that car bombings in Saudi Arabia may have been overseen by al Qaeda leaders in Iran -- part of a pattern, U.S. officials assert, of threatening actions emanating from within Iran's borders. Some U.S. officials say intelligence reports of al Qaeda's presence in Iran are strong enough that the Bush administration shouldn't continue even informal diplomatic contacts unless Tehran cooperates in rounding up members of the terrorist network.

Monday, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asef said Iran has no interest in helping al Qaeda's Islamic militants. A number of the group's members may have slipped into the country illegally, he said, and several are currently under investigation, but none has been identified as a senior member. "We do not know who these are. How can we say that they are senior members of al Qaeda or not?" he said, according to IRNA, the official Iranian news agency.

Tuesday's White House meeting on Iran, which also will involve senior State Department and Pentagon officials, is meant to assess how responsive Tehran is being to U.S. requests, sent through British diplomats and a United Nations official last week, for movement against the alleged al Qaeda presence in Iran. White House envoy Zalmay Khalilzad has held periodic meetings with Iranian officials in Geneva, but a planned meeting last week was canceled to emphasize U.S. desire for action, administration officials said.

Unless Iranian authorities take more steps against al Qaeda in coming days, Tehran's stance is likely to bolster hard-liners in the Bush administration who have been arguing for several months that the U.S. should adopt a more confrontational stance toward Iran. Since the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, administration officials have accused Tehran of sending agents to foment anti-U.S. sentiment among Iraq's Shiite Muslims, continuing to back anti-Israel terror groups and stepping up a clandestine nuclear-weapons program. U.S. hard-liners are arguing for steps aimed at destabilizing the Iranian regime from within. President Bush has said U.S. policy toward Iran seeks regime change, but officials say he hasn't resolved how aggressively to pursue that, except to play down the option of using military force.

The U.S. is particularly interested in the whereabouts of Saef al-Adel, an Egyptian militant linked to al Qaeda who U.S. officials say is believed to have been in Iran recently. U.S. officials say they have intercepted telephone conversations believed to involve Mr. Adel or his associates from inside Iran discussing the May 12 car bombings in the Saudi capital of Riyadh, in which 34 people -- including eight Americans -- were killed. Iranian officials said during the weekend that they had no information about Mr. Adel.

Even within the Bush administration, a number of questions surround the recent intelligence, including whether the overheard conversations involved individuals planning the attacks or just discussing them afterward. Some U.S. officials say that, while al Qaeda members appear to be in Iran, there is no evidence contradicting the Iranian government's claim that it isn't assisting the group. Other officials argue that Iran's hard-line Revolutionary Guards, who are known to support other terrorist groups such as Hezbollah, probably are providing some covert assistance to al Qaeda.

The internal U.S. debate mirrors similar disagreements last year about whether Iraq under Saddam Hussein was directly aiding al Qaeda in an alliance against the U.S. Little information backing that claim has emerged since the U.S. invasion.

"It's unclear exactly what the full Iranian involvement with the al Qaeda people is," a senior intelligence official said. "There are certainly some [in the administration] who take a hard-core view, and others who say we don't know."

In addition to al Qaeda's activities in the region, much of the U.S.-Iran tension these days has to do with events in Iraq. Iranian officials have angrily accused Washington of failing to live up fully to prewar promises to eradicate the Mujahedin-e-Khalq, an anti-Tehran militia group that for years has mounted cross-border attacks from Iraq.

Although U.S. forces in Iraq now are moving to disarm the group, they also are insisting that an Iraqi Shiite militia known as the Badr Brigades, which was trained and armed by Iranian Revolutionary Guards, turn over all weapons by next month. Tens of thousands of the group's fighters are said to have returned to Iraq after the war and Tehran is likely to view the U.S. move as a way to limit the power of its Iraqi allies in any new Baghdad government.

Tuesday, May 13, 2003

U.S.-Iran Talks Underscore Difficulties in Restoring Ties

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
May 13, 2003
By DAVID S. CLOUD

WASHINGTON -- Bush administration officials have met with Iranian representatives in Geneva for talks on postwar Iraq, but the discussions haven't dealt with restoring diplomatic relations between Washington and Tehran, U.S. and Iranian officials said.

In fact, the talks appear to have underscored their differences. At a meeting earlier this month, senior White House aide Zalmay Khalilzad described U.S. concerns that Tehran might be seeking to disrupt the U.S.-run process for creating a new Iraqi government. Iranian officials complained that the U.S. hadn't followed through on prewar promises to shut down an anti-Tehran militia group, Mujahedin-e-Khalq, that has conducted raids for years from bases in Iraq.

"U.S. officials have shown over the past months that they are not committed to pursuing mutual respect in dealing with Iran," said Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi, who was quoted by Iran's official news agency. That apparently was a reference to U.S. efforts in recent weeks to persuade the International Atomic Energy Agency to find that Iran is violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by pursuing a weapons program, which Tehran denies.

U.S. officials portrayed the meeting as part of regular contacts with Tehran that began before the 2001 war in Afghanistan, but that didn't reflect any movement toward restoring diplomatic ties. "This is not somehow a new opening of diplomatic relations. This is an opportunity to deal with some practical issues," said State Department spokesman Philip Reeker.

But the talks, first reported by USA Today, come at a time when the U.S. is grappling internally with whether to maintain a tough stance toward Tehran or ease tensions that have escalated sharply since the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Some senior officials in the Bush administration say Iran's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and support of anti-Israeli terrorist groups make it the major remaining source of instability in the Middle East. These officials argue for a policy of confronting the Iranian regime in hopes of destabilizing it from within.

Other officials, mainly at the State Department, say that the U.S. needs to reach an understanding with Tehran if it hopes to achieve its near-term goal of building a new Iraqi government. A similar debate about how to deal with the U.S. is going on inside the Iranian government.

Mr. Khalilzad said at the recent meeting that the U.S. intended to follow through on disarming the Mujahedin-e-Khalq, according to two officials. A cease-fire agreement reached by U.S. forces with the MEK, which is listed by the U.S. as a terrorist organization, has angered Iran.

Mr. Asefi made clear that Tehran is watching whether Washington complies with its original promise. Iran fears the U.S. intends to keep the group intact so it can harass Iranians in the future. "We have informed the U.S. through various channels that there is no good or bad terrorist," he said.

Monday, May 12, 2003

Official: U.S., Iran, Held Secret Talks

Associated Press
12 May 03
By BARRY SCHWEID


CAIRO, Egypt - The United States and Iran held several meetings in Geneva, Switzerland, in an effort to ease friction between the two countries, a senior U.S. official said Monday.

The meetings focused on a wide range of issues, including postwar Iraq, in which the Bush administration is attempting to deter Iran from trying to influence the formation of a new government in Baghdad.

Secretary of State Colin Powell, during a news conference here after a meeting with Egyptian officials, said the administration opposes a fundamentalist regime as not being in the interest of the Iraqi people.

Powell echoed a similar statement weeks ago by Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, who said establishment of an Iranian-style fundamentalist government would be unacceptable to the United States.

The official, who spoke condition on anonymity, said the meetings in Geneva were technically under the auspices of the United Nations.

USA Today, reporting on the talks in Monday's editions, said the government of Iran was weighing the possibility of reopening diplomatic relations with the United States for the first time in nearly a quarter century.

The official Iranian news agency on Monday quoted Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi saying the discussions were about the work in Afghanistan and were conducted through the auspices of the Swiss Embassy in Tehran.

"During these negotiations, the issue of bilateral relations was not on the agenda and no negotiations were held in that regard," he was quoted as saying by the IRNA news agency in Tehran.


Powell, on a flight Saturday to the Middle East, said the United States has long been in communication with Iran through various channels.

However, he said at the time that the administration was not trying to restore diplomatic relations with Tehran, which were broken off in 1979, when militants overran the U.S. embassy and took dozens of Americans as hostages.

U.S., Iran Stall On Road to Rapprochement

Bush Administration Divided on How to Resolve Renewed Tensions Over Iraq, Nuclear Plans
The Wall Street Journal
May 12, 2003
By DAVID S. CLOUD


When the Bush administration this month asked the Iranian government through intermediaries to turn over Iraqi officials or terrorists who crossed into their territory, a U.S. official says Tehran's reply was caustic: We had a deal to cooperate, and you haven't lived up to it.

The Iranians were upset that Washington hadn't followed through on prewar assurances that coalition forces invading Iraq would eliminate the Mujahedin-e-Khalq, an anti-Tehran militia group that for years has mounted cross-border attacks from Iraq.

The back-channel messages, which the official said were conveyed by British diplomats, show how a relationship that in some ways had been quietly improving after the war in Afghanistan has deteriorated since the invasion of Iraq. Now, U.S. officials accuse Tehran of sending agents to foment anti-U.S. sentiment among Iraq's Shiite Muslims, continuing to back anti-Israel terror groups and stepping up a clandestine nuclear-weapons program.

How the U.S. -- with thousands of troops on Iran's western flank -- confronts these issues has become a major foreign-policy question for the Bush administration. And the issue has revived an internal U.S. government debate about how to deal with Iran , a country the U.S. hasn't had formal relations with since Islamic clerics took power in a 1979 revolution.

Some State Department officials argue that the best way to improve Tehran's behavior, in addition to public pressure, is to quietly signal to people loyal to President Mohammad Khatami that Washington's goals in the region don't include the regime's ouster. If the Iranians don't feel threatened, these officials argue, they will be less apt to meddle in Iraq and may even decide that developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles is less urgent.

That view isn't shared by other administration officials. Some in the Pentagon and White House favor a more confrontational approach, based on their view that Iran's hard-line clerics retain too much authority to abandon policies objectionable to Washington without sustained pressure. They argue for steps aimed at destabilizing the Iranian regime from within, including a proposed $50 million fund for pro-democracy radio and satellite broadcasts into the country by Iranian-Americans.

"America must abandon any talk of engaging the self-proclaimed reformers [in Iran ] who have not reformed the system in the seven years they have been in power," says Sen. Sam Brownback, a Kansas Republican who is pushing the broadcasting fund in Congress.

Leading up to the Iraq war, the White House was much more inclined to woo Tehran than it is now. Despite fears about Iranian meddling after the U.S. war in Afghanistan, Iran played a constructive role after that conflict, supporting Hamid Karzai's fledgling government, said former State Department Afghanistan envoy James Dobbins.

U.S. officials hoped that would continue heading into the Iraq conflict. In January, White House aide Zalmay Khalilzad and State Department officials assured Iranian representatives at a meeting in northern Iraq that the imminent U.S. invasion wouldn't threaten -- and might even benefit -- Tehran. The Iranians were told that one of the U.S. war aims was to eliminate the Mujahedin-e-Khalq, a longtime Iranian goal. In return, the U.S. asked Iran not to send armed fighters into Iraq, U.S. officials say. Neither side completely complied.

After the hostilities, the Pentagon negotiated a temporary cease-fire that confined the Mujahedin-e-Khalq to bases in eastern Iraq but allowed it to keep its weapons. The arrangement was described as temporary, but it stirred Iranians' fears that the U.S. wanted the group intact to harass them in the future.

Pentagon officials wrote a memo last month suggesting that the White House could consider naming the Mujahedin-e-Khalq "a legitimate Iranian opposition group," despite its status as a U.S.-designated terrorist group, according to a U.S. official who quoted from the document. A Pentagon spokesman denied the department had proposed the idea, but the group's future was discussed at a senior-level meeting two weeks ago, officials said. The State Department's top counterterrorism official, Cofer Black, argued that would undermine U.S. credibility when it asked other countries to crack down on terrorist groups. Mr. Bush sided with the State Department, and U.S. forces in Iraq now are moving to disarm and eliminate the Mujahedin-e-Khalq.

State Department officials say that decision at least in part is meant to reinforce the message that the U.S. isn't looking to meddle inside Iran -- just as Tehran shouldn't interfere in Iraq.

But U.S. officials say Iranian Revolutionary Guards -- militants loyal to Iran's hard-line clerics -- are seeking to play a role inside Iraq, both by infiltrating the country themselves and by working through Iraqi Shiite clerics, many of whom have spent years living in Iran . Even Iraqis whom the U.S. is counting on to play major roles in an interim Iraqi government have ties to Tehran. One U.S. official said Iranian agents are telling Iraqis that the U.S. doesn't have the stomach for the long haul and will be gone soon. "The message is, 'Don't get too close to the Americans,' " the official said.

Mr. Bush hasn't resolved the disagreement among his advisers, except to play down the option of using military force to achieve regime change in Iran . Secretary of State Colin Powell has little interest in attempting to hold direct talks with the Iranians, as he did recently with the Syrians. Officially, Iran continues to reject direct dialogue with the U.S., but Washington also has spurned what appear to be recent overtures from Tehran that seem to reflect hopes for better relations.

"We do have channels that we are using with the Iranians, and communicating to them that they ought to review their policies," Mr. Powell told reporters during the weekend. He played down the prospect of seeking better ties with Tehran, though. "The issue of diplomatic relations is not on the table right now, on either side."

Since the war ended, the administration has chosen a more confrontational path. Administration officials are trying to build support among governments that sit on the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency to condemn what the U.S. contends is Iran's secret nuclear-weapons program. Iran says its nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes. U.S. officials acknowledge Iran is still years away from producing such weapons, but they say inspections of several facilities and other recently obtained intelligence have convinced the U.S. that Iran is working faster than previously known.

The U.S. has supplied Russia and other countries on the IAEA board with some of its intelligence, although a senior U.S. official says it remains unclear what findings the IAEA board will make when it meets next month. Imposing sanctions on Tehran through the United Nations Security Council for its nuclear activities will be difficult. Unlike Iraq and even North Korea, Iran has relations with many European countries and Russia, and their governments appear reluctant to jeopardize these ties by joining a campaign to isolate Tehran.

Complicating the policy debate is that U.S. officials are divided about how much of a threat such Iranian influence poses in Iraq. Some warn that Iran is trying to actively block U.S. hopes of installing a friendly regime in Baghdad. Israeli officials have told the White House that the same thing could happen to the U.S. in Iraq as happened to Israel's troops in southern Lebanon during the 1980s and 1990s. There, Iranian-backed Hezbollah Shiite militants fought a guerilla war that ultimately drove out the Israelis.

But other U.S. officials argue that Iran is waiting to see how events unfold, and how much political power fellow Shiites will have in Iraq. And it is weighing whether the U.S. is plotting to oust them from power next, says a senior U.S. intelligence official. The more threatening the Bush administration appears to Iranian officials in coming months, "the more active Tehran will be in Iraq to try to keep us tied down so we can't focus on them," predicted a U.S. intelligence official.